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ABSTRACT
Multifamily Malware Models
by Samanvitha Basole
When training a machine learning model, there is likely to be a tradeoff between
the accuracy of the model and the generality of the dataset. Previous research has
shown that if we train a model to detect one specific malware family, we obtain
stronger results as compared to a case where we train a single model on multiple
diverse families. During the detection phase, it would be more efficient to have a
single model that could detect multiple families, rather than having to score each
sample against multiple models. In this research, we conduct experiments to quantify
the relationship between the generality of the training dataset and the accuracy of
the resulting model within the context of the malware detection problem.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has been successfully applied in the malware domain,
especially in detecting malware [1, 2]. Previous research has shown that ML approaches
are better at detecting malware than traditional signature-based ones. For example, [3]
and [4] have achieved high detection rates and very low false positive rates using
machine learning techniques.
Machine learning can be applied to large datasets. In this paper, we consider
the malware detection problem based on ‘‘big data’’ to quantify the effect of an
increasingly generic dataset. Our goal is to examine the effectiveness of n-grams and
the robustness of various machine learning techniques for detecting malware.
Our experiments are based on an extremely large and diverse malware dataset [5].
A significant part of this work involves efficiently collecting and analyzing features
from a dataset that is on the order of half a terabyte.
We consider bigram features and employ a variety of machine learning techniques.
Specifically, the machine learning techniques that we apply are k-nearest neighbors
(k-NN), support vector machines (SVM), random forests, and deep learning [6, 7, 8, 9].
We deal with issues such as under-fitting and over-fitting by training on a large
number of malware samples and by using cross-validation [8].
A complete set of experiments is conducted by first training and testing models for
individual families, then we consider models designed to detect pairs of families, triples
of families, and so on, up to a single model for all 20 families under consideration. In
this way, we produce models that are progressively more generic [10].
We measure the accuracy of these models, which enables us to quantify the
tradeoff between these important aspects of the problem. This analysis also enables
us to determine which of the machine learning techniques under consideration is best
1

able to generalize to the case where multiple diverse families are modeled.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses previous
work related to this research problem. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of our
experiments. Chapter 4 describes the malware families used in the experiments, the
workings of the machine learning techniques considered, and the implementation
details involved in this research. In Chapter 5, we present and analyze the results
of our experiments. Finally, in Chapter 6, we summarize this research and discuss
possible avenues for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
In this chapter, we first discuss the effectiveness of using machine learning
techniques for classifying malware. We also discuss the motivation and the previous
work done in the domain of malware classification using n-grams, and we then give
an overview of how our research compares with and builds upon the previous work.
Signature-based malware detection techniques have been very popular in detecting
malware. Such techniques rely on pattern matching. Due to this, signature-based
techniques are good for known malware, but as malware creators turn around to defeat
such techniques and create new malware, signature-based methods cannot detect
unknown malware.
In recent years, machine learning has become a successful method in detecting
unknown malware with low false positives. Additionally, machine learning has been
useful in detecting malware efficiently as it can scale up to handle big data.
Supervised machine learning involves training a model using known data and
then validating the predictions of the model. In the malware domain, this process can
be used to detect malware or to classify a sample into its malware family.
Machine learning requires features or attributes to be used in order to form the
basis for classification. A few examples of features include opcodes, file headers, API
calls, and n-grams.
2.1

Previous Work
An n-gram is a continuous sequence of n strings extracted from a text. In the

malware domain, n-grams have been successfully and widely used as features for
malware detection.
In [11], the authors use n-grams as file signatures to detect unknown malware with
a low false positive ratio. They use the k-nearest neighbor algorithm to experiment
3

with different values of n for n-grams. Their results reveal that 4-grams are best for
low false positives and a maximum detection rate.
In [12], the authors achieve an accuracy of 96.64% with 4-grams and SVM. They
experiment using decision tree, artificial neural network, and support vector machines
to classify malware into 10 families. Their dataset consists of 12,199 files in total.
In [13], the authors describe a feature selection method using class-wise document
frequency. They explain the steps in selecting relevant n-grams:
• n-grams are extracted and class-wise document frequencies are computed from
virus files as well as benign files
• n-grams are sorted in descending order
• Top k n-grams are selected
• Top n-grams from virus and benign are combined to form the relevant set of
n-grams
We follow a similar approach but do not consider the top n-grams from the benign
dataset.
The authors in [14] claim that n-grams overestimate classification and promote
overfitting. They implemented elastic-net regularized logistic regression [15] where
they used a regularization path to examine the accuracy and other properties as a
function of the regularized parameter. Elastic-net, a regularized method, was used with
a logistic regression model. The authors achieved low weighted accuracy scores using
their dataset. They used orders of magnitude more data than other n-gram-related
works, but the dataset is undisclosed and comes from an industry partner which makes
the study hard to replicate and compare results.
In [10], the authors performed experiments using n-grams as features for different
machine learning models. Their techniques included SVM, a chi-square test, k-NN,
and random forest. Their feature extraction step involved selecting the 10 most4

frequent n-grams from the benign set and the malware set, resulting in a feature
vector of size 20. They found that a random forest classifier is more robust than other
techniques and determined the tradeoff between the generality of a model and the
accuracy of its classification. They concluded that as the model becomes more generic,
the accuracy goes down.
Our research uses a similar approach as described in [10] by using n-grams to
determine the tradeoff between the generality and the accuracy of a model. In contrast,
we use 20 families instead of 8, a different feature selection method, and different
machine learning techniques, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
In this chapter, we explain the feature extraction step, the pattern of classification
experiments, and the machine learning pipeline used for each experiment. We begin
by gathering a benign dataset of 1000 files and a malware dataset of 20 malware
families, each family consisting of 1000 files. Chapter 4 discusses the details of this
process. Once the dataset is collected, n-grams are extracted.
3.1

Feature Extraction
The top 100 bigrams from each malware file are stored as a dictionary consisting

of the bigram and its frequency. Bigrams are formed by extracting bytes from the
executable files. We perform the same procedure for all benign files, but we store the
top 500 bigrams and their frequencies instead of the top 100. This approach of storing
the dictionary worked efficiently for handling big data and extracting bigrams.
3.2

Classification Experiments
We conduct several experiments to test our hypothesis of how accuracy is affected

as the model becomes more generic. Our first experiment is using five-fold crossvalidation to perform a binary classification of 1000 malware files (from one specific
family) and 1000 benign files. We perform such binary classification using 20 different
malware families. This step involves detecting a specific malware family.
In the second step (or level), we combine two different malware families to form
the malware class and classify files as benign or malware. At the Nth level, there
are

 
20
N

possible combinations of malware families, and hence,

experiment with min(100,

 
20
N

 
20
N

experiments. We

) combinations at each step, where the combinations are

selected at random. Figure 1 shows two of the many experiments at level 5. The last
experiment involves combining 20 families to form the malware class, which results in
a generalized dataset. Figure 2 shows the final experiment using 20 malware families.
6

Figure 1: Two of

 
20
5

possible experiments at level 5

The top diagram combines families 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14 into the malware class while the
bottom diagram combines families 1, 2, 18, 19, and 20.

3.3

Machine Learning Pipeline
In this section, we discuss the step-by-step machine learning process for each

experiment, which includes selecting a subset of features, transforming data for
modeling, training and testing, and evaluating the model performance using metrics.
Figure 3 illustrates the experiment pipeline consisting of the setup and the machine
learning process.

7

Figure 2: Experiment at level 20 (all 20 families combined as the malware class)
3.3.1

Feature Selection

From the malware class, the top 20 bigrams are selected based on their frequencies.
When multiple families are combined in order to make the model generic, these multiple
families belong to one class—the malware class. In this case, all families are treated
equally, and the top bigrams are chosen from among these combined files.
3.3.2

Data Transformation for Modeling

Each file from the benign and the malware class is transformed into a vector of
frequencies corresponding to the top 20 bigrams. We normalize the frequency vectors
to make it row stochastic. These vectors form the training and the testing set. This set
of vectors changes every time a family is added or removed causing the top bigrams to
change. Therefore, for every experiment, we restart from the feature selection process.
3.3.3

Classification and Evaluation

For the classification step, we use cross-validation to remove any bias in accuracy
caused by over-fitting. We use stratified k-fold technique where each fold maintains

8

Figure 3: Experiment Pipeline
the class ratio from the dataset. Five-fold cross-validation was used to split the dataset
in five parts, and to train using four parts and test on one part. The final step is
evaluating the results using the metrics discussed in Chapter 4
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CHAPTER 4
Implementation
In this chapter, we give a broad summary of the malware families and the datasets
used in the research. Also, we briefly discuss the machine learning techniques that
were used in the experiments.
4.1

Dataset and Malware Families Used
The experiments consist of a malware dataset and a benign dataset. The benign

dataset contains 1000 .exe files that came pre-installed in a Windows 10 laptop.
Three malware families (Winwebsec, Zeroaccess, and Zbot) are used from the Malicia
dataset [16], and the remaining seventeen families are used from a big dataset collected
using VirusShare [5]. The big dataset is more than half a terabyte consisting of more
than 500,000 executable files, but we used only a few families consisting of at least 1000
files. Table 1 lists the 20 families and the type of each malware family, and the family
descriptions for the same type are mentioned in the same paragraph. Figure 4 shows
a list of the families with a unique color label for the malware type column.
Table 1: Type of each malware family
Malware Family

Type

Malware Family

Type

Adload [17]
Agent [19]
Alureon [21]
BHO [23]
CeeInject
Cycbot.G [25]
DelfInject [27]
FakeRean [29]
Hotbar [31]
Lolyda.BF [33]

Trojan Downloader
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
VirTool
Backdoor
VirTool
Rogue
Adware
Password Stealer

Obfuscator [18]
OnLineGames [20]
Rbot [22]
Renos
Startpage [24]
Vobfus [26]
Vundo [28]
Winwebsec [30]
Zbot [32]
Zeroaccess [34]

VirTool
Password Stealer
Backdoor
Trojan Downloader
Trojan
Worm
Trojan Downloader
Rogue
Password Stealer
Trojan Horse

10

Figure 4: Colored malware types indicate the use of generic data
Adload downloads an executable file, stores it remotely, runs the file, and disables
proxy settings [17]. Renos downloads software that claims the system has a spyware
and asks for a payment to remove the spyware [35]. Vundo displays pop-up ads and
may download files. It uses advanced techniques to defeat detection [28].
Agent downloads trojans or other software from a remote server [19]. Alureon
sends usernames, passwords, credit card data, and other confidential data from the
system to hackers [21]. BHO performs actions guided by a hacker [23]. Startpage
changes the browser homepage and may perform malicious activities [24].
CeeInject obfuscates to avoid being detected by the anti-virus software [36].
DelfInject sends usernames, passwords, and other personal information to hackers [27].
Obfuscator tries to obfuscate or hide itself to defeat malware detectors [18].
Cycbot.G connects to a remote server, exploits vulnerabilities, and spreads
through backdoor ports [25]. Rbot gives control to hackers through a channel that

11

allows them access to information, helps them launch attacks, and serves as a gate to
spread infection [22].
FakeRean pretends to scan the system, notifies the user of issues, and asks the
user to pay in order to clean the system [29]. Winwebsec runs programs that display
alerts and ask the user for money to fix those issues [30].
Lolyda.BF sends information from and monitors an infected system. It can share
user credentials and network activity with hackers [33]. OnLineGames steals login
information of online games and tracks user keystroke activity [20]. Zbot is installed
through emails, shares users’ personal information with hackers, and can turn off the
firewall [32].
Hotbar is an adware that shows ads on webpages and installs adware [31]. Vobfus
is a worm that downloads malware and spreads through USB drives or other removable
drives [26]. Zeroaccess is a trojan horse that downloads applications to click on ads to
make money for malware creators [34].
4.2

Background of Classification Techniques and Metrics
In this section, we include the machine learning concepts used in the experiments.

We cover k-nearest neighbors, support vector machines, random forest, and multi-layer
perceptron.
4.2.1

Support Vector Machines

Support vector machines (SVM) is a supervised learning method that is based
on four major ideas: generating a separating hyperplane, maximizing the margin or
separation between classes, working in a higher dimensional space, and using the
kernel trick. The technique uses a hyperplane to separate the labeled data into
two classes. A hyperplane is one dimension less than the dimensions of the given
data. Such a hyperplane tries to maximize the margin in order to generalize and
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reduce classification error. The algorithm works in a high-dimensional space, finds
the hyperplane, and transforms the data using a kernel function [8].
For example, in Figure 5, it can be noted that there are infinite possibilities to
separate the phishing and the non-phishing points. However, SVM tries to maximize
the margin by selecting the bolded line.

Figure 5: Example classification using SVM
4.2.2

k-Nearest Neighbors

One of the simplest algorithms in machine learning is k-nearest neighbors (k-NN).
The training phase of k-NN consists of calculating distances from one point to all
other points; while the testing phase consists of sorting the distances, choosing the
k-closest distances, and then assigning the majority of class vote from the k-nearest
distances. In general, training a k-NN classifier is computationally expensive for large
datasets. On the other hand, classification is comparatively less complex.
Figure 6 shows an example plot of phishing and non-phishing samples. The
following steps are followed to classify a point with k = 3.
• For k = 3, we choose the 3-closest neighbors as represented by the points that
fall on or in the bigger circle.
• Next, we sort the distances and choose the k-nearest distances.
• We assign the majority of class vote from those 3-nearest neighbors to the test
13

Figure 6: Example classification using k-NN
instance. In this case, we assign the test instance as a phishing sample based on
the 2/3 majority vote.
4.2.3

Random Forest

A random forest generalizes a decision tree algorithm. A decision tree is a simple
machine learning algorithm that is built on the idea of constructing a tree based on
the features from the training data. It is easy to classify once the tree is built, but the
disadvantage is that the tree tends to overfit the input data resulting in a low testing
accuracy. A random forest combines multiple decision trees to generalize the training
data. To do so, random forest uses different subsets of the training data as well as
different subsets of features. Then, a majority vote is used to classify the data [8]. In
decision trees, the best split is chosen using all variables, whereas in random forest,
the best split is chosen using a random subset [37].
4.2.4

Multi-layer Perceptron

Neural networks model the brain’s neurons. MLP is a type of neural network
with fully-connected layers consisting of an input layer and an output layer along
with one or more hidden layers. Back-propagation is used to train an MLP in order
to determine its weights. The back-propagation algorithm modifies weights in such a
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way that errors are greatly reduced. The optimal weights are determined using partial
derivatives [8].
The main advantage of this algorithm is that it can learn non-linear models using
a set of features and a target. On the other hand, MLP is not robust against feature
scaling and can result in different outcomes because the hidden layers have multiple
local minima [38].
4.2.5

Evaluation Metrics

The final step is evaluating the model. We use balanced accuracy to evaluate
the machine learning model.
4.2.5.1

Balanced Accuracy

Accuracy is defined as the number of correct classifications divided by the total
number of samples and is calculated as
accuracy =

TP + TN
.
P+N

(1)

In Equation 1, TP (true positive) is the number of samples correctly classified as
positive, and TN (true negative) is the number of samples correctly classified as
negative. P is the total number of positive samples, and N is the total number
of negative samples [8]. The positive, or malware, samples in our dataset are of
size 20,000 while negative, or benign, samples are of size 1000. Due to this imbalance,
we use balanced accuracy to weigh both classes equally. It is defined as
1 TP TN
+
.
2 P
N


balanced accuracy =
4.3



(2)

Programming Details
In this section, we discuss implementation-related details of our experiments. We

used Python to code the experiments and a one TB hard drive to store the dataset.
All experiments were run on a 2014 MacBook Pro laptop.
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Each file is read as bytes, and bigrams are formed using this data. The dictionary
of the top 100 bigrams and frequencies is stored in a file. The cPickle library [39] is
used to store the dictionary representations of the .exe files. It is a module implemented
in C and is used to serialize an object; that is, to store a Python object as a series of
bytes. The same file can later be loaded using cPickle. We used this approach of
storing bigrams in a file instead of opening multiple files at once and forming bigrams
because forming bigrams for thousands of files is an expensive process. By using
dictionaries, we are ignoring bigrams that are not very frequent. Dictionaries have
the following advantages in our experiments.
• Feature selection involves combining a few dictionaries instead of extracting
bytes, forming bigrams, and considering the top bigrams. We have eliminated
repetitive tasks by storing that data as dictionaries.
• Creating the training and testing set involves getting the count of each of the
top bigrams from each file. The time to access a value in a dictionary by its key
is very fast, which helped speed up the process.
For malware files, each dictionary contained the top 100 bigrams while for benign
files, each dictionary contained the top 500 bigrams. Each of the 20 malware families
had a dictionary consisting of the top 1500 bigrams from that family. A Counter
object, which is a dict subclass, from the collections module [40] was used as a
dictionary.
The combinations function from the itertools module [41] generates combinations given a list of malware families.
Once all the combinations are generated, min(100,

 
20
N

) combinations are chosen

randomly to perform experiments at the Nth level. We found that running 100
experiments at each level was a good balance between accurate results and an efficient
run time.
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The shuffle function from the random module [42] was used to randomly select
a subset of experiments to run. The function uses the Fisher-Yates shuffle which is an
unbiased algorithm. The algorithm runs through the list of combinations in reverse
order and randomly picks an element to exchange. After the shuffle, the first 100
combinations were chosen.
Scikit-learn library [38] was used to run SVM, k-NN, random forest, and
MLP experiments. The model_selection module was used to perform 5-fold crossvalidation, and the metrics module was used for calculating the balanced accuracy.
To preserve the class ratio in experiments, the StratifiedKFold function was used,
and to ensure that one fold would not consist of files from a specific family (especially
at level 5 where 5 families are used), the shuffle parameter was set to True. A linear
SVC model was used for classification using support vector machines. The neighbors
for k-NN were set to 5. Random forest used 10 for the n_estimators and 10 for the
max_depth. The lbfgs solver was used as a parameter for MLP.
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CHAPTER 5
Results and Analysis
In this chapter, we discuss the results and analysis of the experiments performed on
SVM, k-NN, random forest, and MLP. Although this chapter may mention accuracy,
it refers to balanced accuracy. We begin by discussing the binary classification
results of individual family models where we classified files from a specific family into
benign and malware classes. Next, we discuss the results of multifamily models where
we combined multiple malware families in the malware class and performed binary
classification experiments.
5.1

Individual Family Models
In this section, we list individual accuracies, note the average balanced accuracy

at level 1, and analyze the overall effectiveness of classifying one specific family as
benign or malware.
5.1.1

Support Vector Machines

Table 2 shows the results of classifying individual families using SVM. The average
balanced accuracy at level 1 using SVM is 88.88%. Considering that this number is
an average of 20 experiments, it appears that SVM worked well to classify individual
families with 1000 files in each class. Figure 7 shows an illustration created in Tableau.
It can be noted that 9 families are below the average of 88% using the legend given
in the figure. Two families (Agent and DelfInject) are far below the average, while
three families (Vobfus, Adload, and Hotbar) are far above the average. The difference
between the highest and the lowest accuracy is 19.81%. Despite the wide range, the
high accuracy score implies a good performance of the families at level 1. Overall,
SVM was a successful technique with a majority of families classified with a balanced
accuracy greater than the average of 88.88%. A bar plot is included in the Appendix.
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Table 2: SVM balanced accuracies for individual families
Malware Family

Accuracy%

Malware Family

Accuracy%

Adload
Agent
Alureon
BHO
CeeInject
Cycbot.G
DelfInject
FakeRean
Hotbar
Lolyda.BF

97.60
79.48
89.64
90.95
87.14
92.24
77.79
84.09
97.55
91.80

Obfuscator
OnLineGames
Rbot
Renos
Startpage
Vobfus
Vundo
Winwebsec
Zbot
Zeroaccess

86.94
91.54
82.04
90.60
86.75
95.15
88.34
94.05
82.10
91.60

Figure 7: Individual accuracies for SVM
5.1.2

k-Nearest Neighbors

Table 3 shows the results of classifying individual families using k-NN. The
average balanced accuracy at level 1 using k-NN is 95.87%. This is a very high
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average accuracy, signifying that the technique worked very well for classifying
individual families. Figure 8 shows an illustration created in Tableau. It can be
noted that 9 families are below the average of 95.87% using the legend given in the
figure. DelfInject is far below the average while 6 families (Vobfus, Lolyda.BF, Adload,
Hotbar, Zeroaccess, and Winwebsec) have accuracies greater than 98%. A bar plot is
included in the Appendix. The difference between the highest and the lowest accuracy
is 11.21%, which is very narrow compared to the SVM range of 19.81%. The high
average accuracy implies the robustness of k-NN while the range tells us that there
are a few families which are comparatively harder to detect. Overall, k-NN performed
extremely well in classifying individual families with all but one accuracy greater
than 90%.
Table 3: k-NN balanced accuracies for individual families

5.1.3

Malware Family

Accuracy%

Malware Family

Accuracy%

Adload
Agent
Alureon
BHO
CeeInject
Cycbot.G
DelfInject
FakeRean
Hotbar
Lolyda.BF

98.65
94.25
94.30
97.55
94.60
98.40
87.84
93.35
98.65
98.60

Obfuscator
OnLineGames
Rbot
Renos
Startpage
Vobfus
Vundo
Winwebsec
Zbot
Zeroaccess

91.05
96.00
92.85
96.90
95.85
98.10
95.20
98.85
97.40
99.05

Random Forest

Table 4 shows the results of classifying individual families using random forest.
The average balanced accuracy at level 1 using random forest is 98.23%, which is
significantly better than the results of SVM and k-NN. Figure 9 shows an illustration
created in Tableau. It can be noted that 10 families are below the average accuracy
20

Figure 8: Individual accuracies for k-NN
of 98.23% using the legend given in the figure. DelfInject and Agent, two families
with the lowest accuracies, are less than 3% below the average. Winwebsec, the family
with the highest accuracy, has an accuracy of 99.95%, only 0.05% less than a perfect
classification. The difference between the highest and the lowest accuracy is 4.35%.
This range and the average balanced accuracy suggest that this technique produced
excellent results. A bar plot showing the individual family accuracies for random
forest is included in the Appendix.
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Table 4: Random forest balanced accuracies for individual families

5.1.4

Malware Family

Accuracy%

Malware Family

Accuracy%

Adload
Agent
Alureon
BHO
CeeInject
Cycbot.G
DelfInject
FakeRean
Hotbar
Lolyda.BF

99.35
95.90
98.00
99.20
97.45
99.35
95.60
96.65
99.35
99.65

Obfuscator
OnLineGames
Rbot
Renos
Startpage
Vobfus
Vundo
Winwebsec
Zbot
Zeroaccess

96.10
98.15
96.90
98.15
98.75
99.45
97.95
99.95
99.25
99.45

Multi-layer Perceptron

Table 5 shows the results of classifying individual families using MLP. The
average balanced accuracy at level 1 using MLP is 93.97%, which is greater than the
level 1 average for SVM. A bar plot is included in the Appendix. Figure 10 shows an
illustration created in Tableau. It can be noted that 10 families are below the average
of 93.97% using the legend given in the figure. Alureon, DelfInject, and FakeRean have
low accuracies while Adload, BHO, Hotbar, and Zeroaccess have accuracies greater
than 98%. The difference between the highest and the lowest accuracy is 12.36%.
This range is close to the k-NN range of 11.21%. Overall, MLP classified individual
malware families resulting in a high accuracy and a narrow range.
5.1.5

Overall Results for Individual Families

Figure 11 shows boxplots for each technique. Each point on the boxplot represents
the accuracy of classifying an individual family. The line on the box or the median
for each boxplot indicates symmetry. It can be seen that the accuracies of SVM are
left-skewed. The fact that the median of the SVM boxplot is higher than its mean
of 88.88% justifies the skew. For SVM, it indicates that the high accuracies are closer
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Figure 9: Individual accuracies for random forest
together than the low accuracies. The SVM box is relatively larger than the k-NN
box, indicating that the accuracies of SVM are spread across a wide range while the
accuracies of k-NN are concentrated in a smaller region. The short whisker at the top
for the k-NN box indicates that the data points above the median are closer to each
other compared to the bottom 50%. The accuracies of SVM have higher variability
than the acuracies of k-NN. The box of k-NN closely resembles the box of random
forest. Both have a short whisker at the top, have accuracies clustered in a few regions,
and have shorter boxes compared to MLP and SVM.
MLP, like SVM, has a bigger box size with accuracies spread across the box. The
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Table 5: MLP balanced accuracies for individual families
Malware Family

Accuracy%

Malware Family

Accuracy%

Adload
Agent
Alureon
BHO
CeeInject
Cycbot.G
DelfInject
FakeRean
Hotbar
Lolyda.BF

98.05
90.65
86.74
98.45
93.30
97.80
87.65
87.94
98.70
95.70

Obfuscator
OnLineGames
Rbot
Renos
Startpage
Vobfus
Vundo
Winwebsec
Zbot
Zeroaccess

90.95
95.15
91.00
91.75
93.60
97.40
93.35
97.05
95.05
99.10

Figure 10: Individual accuracies for MLP
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wide spread in the balanced accuracies of SVM shows that this technique magnified the
balanced accuracies based on how hard or easy it was to detect a specific family. The
length of the whiskers indicates tail length. The long whiskers of SVM indicate that
the population is heavy-tailed while the k-NN data indicate that it has a light-tailed
population. There is one outlier indicated by a diamond-shaped point in the k-NN
data. This outlier is the balanced accuracy of DelfInject.

Figure 11: Individual balanced accuracies for all techniques
Figure 12 shows the ROC curves for the DelfInject family. ROC curves show the
relationship between the false positive rate and the true positive rate of a classification.
AUC is the area under the curve and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with 1.0 meaning that there
are no false positives or false negatives at a certain threshold [8]. The AUC for k-NN,
random forest, and MLP show excellent scores of 0.90 or higher. All four techniques
are farther from the black-dotted diagonal line, indicating that all techniques have
performed well on DelfInject, which was classified with the lowest accuracy for SVM,
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k-NN, and random forest. It had the second lowest accuracy for MLP. The fact that
all techniques had an AUC of above 0.85 shows how well all techniques performed for
individual families, even for the family which was harder to detect.

Figure 12: ROC curves for DelfInject
5.2

Multifamily Models
In this section, we list the average balanced accuracies at each level, graph the

average, the lowest, and the highest accuracies, and analyze the overall effectiveness
of multifamily models for SVM, random forest, k-NN, and MLP.
5.2.1

Support Vector Machines

Table 6 lists the average balanced accuracies for multifamily models using SVM.
At level 1, the average balanced accuracy is 88.88%. For models with pairs of malware
families, the average balanced accuracy is 78.30%. At level 20, the accuracy drops
to 51.90%. Figure 13 graphs the data in Table 6 showing 3 lines which represent the
average, the lowest, and the highest balanced accuracies at each level.
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From level 1 to level 5, the average accuracy has drastically dropped with the
maximum drop from level 1 to level 2. This means that classification experiments
which consisted of two malware families in the malware class resulted in the greatest
drop. From level 5 onwards, the drop is almost uniform at each level. This means
that adding one more family at each level lowers the accuracy consistently.
From level 7 onwards, the three almost-parallel lines indicate that the area
between the average line and the high line is almost equal to the area between the
average line and the low line. In contrast, starting from level 1 to level 7, the area
between the average line and the high line is greater than the area between the average
line and the low line. Although the average is pulled to the low line initially, it remains
centered as more families are added.
Table 6: SVM average balanced accuracies for multifamily models

5.2.2

Level

Accuracy%

Level

Accuracy%

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

88.88
78.30
72.16
67.97
65.50
63.73
62.49
61.74
61.08
60.29

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

59.21
58.47
57.85
56.38
55.41
53.82
53.38
52.98
52.42
51.90

k-Nearest Neighbors

Table 7 lists the average balanced accuracies at each level. Figure 14 shows a
line graph representing the average, the lowest, and the highest balanced accuracies
at each level. The overall trend shows that as the model becomes more generic with
one more family added at each step, the performance is decreasing.
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Figure 13: SVM results for all levels showing average (of 100 experiments), low, and
high accuracies and linear fit lines
Table 7: k-NN average balanced accuracies for multifamily models
Level

Accuracy%

Level

Accuracy%

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

95.87
95.20
94.99
94.48
93.79
93.58
93.20
93.07
92.79
92.51

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

92.46
92.26
92.28
92.12
92.02
92.05
91.94
91.92
91.97
92.00
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Figure 14: k-NN results for all levels showing average (of 100 experiments), low, and
high accuracies and linear fit lines
5.2.3

Random Forest

Random forest experiments were run using different parameters for levels 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20. Table 8 shows how the balanced accuracy for random
forest changes as more families are added and as the maximum depth of the tree
increases, and Figure 15 graphs the data as a line chart. A parameter in random
forest that specifies the maximum depth of the tree is max_depth [38]. At level 1,
the accuracy changes from 93 to 97 to 98 for max_depth 2, 5, and 10 respectively.
At this level, the accuracies do not differ significantly. At level 20, the accuracy
changes from 50 to 83 to 93 as the max_depth increases from 2 to 5 to 10. It is
evident from the graph that at each level, as the max_depth increases, the accuracy
increases. Additionally, the accuracy drop at each level can be examined to conclude
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that a higher max_depth parameter of 10 is relatively robust against generic models as
opposed to a parameter value of 2 or 5. It can be said that increasing the max_depth
is preferable for generic models. For all three max_depth values graphed in Figure 15,
the drop from level 1 to level 10 is greater than the drop from level 10 to level 20.
This shows that initially, the drop is very significant. As more families are added
progressively, the drop in accuracy decreases. The relatively big drop in the initial
levels means that each of the 20 malware families are so different that adding one
more family drops the average balanced accuracy significantly. On the other hand,
when 15 families are combined, the accuracy keeps decreasing only slightly as more
families are added because the model is already generic enough that adding one more
family does not make a huge impact.
Table 8: Random forest balanced accuracies for changing depths
Level

max_depth=2

max_depth=5

max_depth=10

1
5
10
15
20

92.85
70.01
56.78
53.98
50.00

97.46
92.34
86.10
82.90
82.53

98.23
96.77
94.81
93.35
92.87

Table 9 shows the average balanced accuracies for multifamily models using
random forest. The average balanced accuracy for classifying a specific family as
malware or benign is 98.23%. When two families are combined, the average balanced
accuracy drops to 97.94%. Finally, when all 20 families are combined in the malware
class, the accuracy drops to 92.87%. Figure 16 graphs the data in Table 9 and shows
three lines representing the average, the lowest, and the highest balanced accuracies
at each level. The average is taken using 100 randomly-chosen experiments.

30

Figure 15: Balanced accuracies for malware combinations at level 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20
using different max_depth parameters for random forest
Table 9: Random forest average balanced accuracies for multifamily models
Level

Accuracy%

Level

Accuracy%

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

98.23
97.94
97.68
97.24
96.77
96.42
96.03
95.74
95.25
94.81

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

94.56
94.14
94.09
93.76
93.35
93.29
93.00
92.94
92.79
92.87
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Figure 16: Random forest results for all levels showing average (of 100 experiments),
low, and high accuracies and linear fit lines
5.2.4

Multi-layer Perceptron

Table 10 shows how the balanced accuracy for MLP changes as more families are
added and as the value of alpha is changed. Figure 17 graphs the data as a line chart.
The penalty parameter in MLP is alpha. For example, a parameter value of 1e-5
signifies larger weights and a complicated decision boundary [38]. The experiments in
Figure 17 indicate that a model with alpha value as 1e-5 performed the best. In all
three cases, the balanced accuracy dropped significantly in the initial levels. After
level 5, the change is subtle.
Table 11 shows a list of accuracies for different combinations of malware families,
and Figure 18 graphs the lowest and the highest accuracies at each level. For the
high case, the downward trend is more evident. The fact that the high case is also
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decreasing means that as more families are added, the overall performance strictly
decreases. The area between the average line and the low line is greater than the area
between the average line and the high line. This means that at each level, there is at
least one experiment which has a significantly lower accuracy than its average case.
Table 10: MLP balanced accuracies for changing alpha
Level

20.0

10.0

1e-5

1
5
10
15
20

83.16
72.91
70.09
71.61
71.96

91.72
78.27
74.71
76.15
77.09

93.97
84.22
80.26
80.07
80.24

Figure 17: Balanced accuracies for malware combinations at level 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20
using different alpha values for MLP
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Table 11: MLP average balanced accuracies for multifamily models
Level

Accuracy%

Level

Accuracy%

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

93.97
90.45
89.10
87.29
84.22
83.63
81.82
81.47
81.06
80.26

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

80.59
80.27
79.92
80.36
80.07
80.37
80.14
79.82
79.45
80.24

Figure 18: MLP results for all levels showing average (of 100 experiments), low, and
high accuracies and linear fit lines
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5.3

Overall Results
Figure 19 summarizes the performance of all the techniques mentioned in the pre-

vious section. It shows how the average balanced accuracy changes from single-family
binary classification experiments to twenty-family binary classification experiments
for SVM, k-NN, random forest, and MLP. Generally, the accuracy decreased as more
families were added to the malware class. For the single-family case, the average
balanced accuracy of random forest was the highest. The same trend followed for
every level. The SVM technique resulted in the lowest accuracy at level 1 through
level 20. For SVM, there was a drastic drop in the initial levels followed by a constant
decrease. For MLP, there was a significant decrease from level 1 to level 7. From
level 7, the constant decrease was almost negligible. For k-NN and random forest,
level 1 through 10 shows a constant decrease while the trend from level 10 through 20
shows an almost-flat line.
It appears from Figure 19 that SVM and MLP are similar to each other while
random forest and k-NN are similar to each other given the parameters specified in
Chapter 4. We compare SVM and MLP in Figure 20, and random forest and k-NN
in Figure 21. Each technique is split into a separate boxplot with its own scale to
provide an enlarged image of the box. These figures represent the results at level 19.
Level 19 involves combining 19 malware families into the malware class in order to
classify as malware or benign.
For the SVM boxplot, there is one outlier significantly above other points while
for the MLP boxplot, there are three outliers lower than the group. The line on the
box shows the median. The SVM box is symmetric with most points scattered in the
first three quartiles. On the other hand, the MLP points are scattered throughout
the boxplot. The mean for the SVM boxplot is 52.42%, and the mean for the MLP
boxplot is 79.45%. The maximum value on the y-axis of the SVM boxplot is lesser
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Figure 19: Average balanced accuracies and linear fit
than the minimum value on the y-axis of the MLP boxplot.
The boxplots of k-NN and random forest in Figure 21 show two outliers for k-NN
and two outliers for RF that are below their respective groups. The median for the
k-NN boxplot is more towards the top of the box while the random forest boxplot
has a symmetric box. At level 19, the mean for k-NN is 91.97%, and the mean for
random forest is 92.79%.
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Figure 20: Balanced accuracies for SVM and MLP at level 19
Each point on the graph represents the classification result of malware (consisting of 19
families) and benign.
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Figure 21: Balanced accuracies for k-NN and RF at level 19
Each point on the graph represents the classification result of malware (consisting of 19
families) and benign.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have used bigram features and machine learning techniques to
examine how accuracy changes when a model is trained using multiple families. First,
we classified each specific family as malware or benign. Then, we trained models using
pairs of families, then triples, and all combinations until we reached a model with
all 20 families. At the Nth level, we considered min(100,

 
20
N

) experiments.

Figure 22 illustrates a bar graph that compares the performance of a specific
model and the most generic model. SVM has the biggest drop from level 1 to level
20. This means that a Linear SVC model was not robust when generic models were
involved. MLP performed significantly better than SVM but not better than random
forest and k-NN. The parameter of k = 5 in k-NN has a very low difference, signifying
that k-NN performed very well compared to SVM and MLP. Random forest had the
highest accuracy for the most specific case (level 1) as well as the most generic case
(level 20) when compared to other techniques. This means that a random forest model
with 10 trees and max_depth 10 was very robust despite a generic dataset. The low
difference between level 1 and level 20 signifies that random forest is a suitable model
when generic (multifamily) models are involved. Overall, in every case, adding more
families to the malware class lowered the accuracy, and this drop increased as the
number of families combined increased. Through each level, the model became more
generic and less effective as families were added.
When classifying one specific family, the accuracies are very high indicating
the strength of bigrams. In the malware domain, the detection problem is based
on classifying a specific family, and in this case, n-grams are a strong feature, as
indicated by the accuracies at level 1. When multiple malware families are involved
in the binary classification, it would be efficient to have a single model that could
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Figure 22: A comparison of average balanced accuracy at level 1 and at level 20 for
all techniques
detect multiple families rather than scoring each sample against multiple specific
models. Since random forest and k-NN were robust even for a very generic dataset,
these techniques could be used to score against a single model trained using multiple
families. On the other hand, SVM could not distinguish well between malware and
benign files when more than 10 families were involved.
6.1

Future Work
In this research, we have worked with a big dataset and considered 20 malware

families with 1000 files in each family. We have used trojans, worms, and other
malware types, so our combinations were composed of a variety of malware families.
Experiments could be conducted where combinations could include families of the same
type, such as adware families. These experiments would show the tradeoff between
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combining families that are of the same type based on their characteristics versus
combining families without any discrimination of types. It would be interesting to see
the results of progressively combining 20 adware families, or 20 backdoor trojans, or 20
such specific family types. The challenge in such a research would involve efficiently
considering only those families which are similar.
Our experiments included binary classification of malware and benign files. Experiments could also involve multi-class classification. Such experiments that involve
classifying and combining multiple malware families help to understand the similarity
or dissimilarity between families.
We have classified malware using bigram features. Further research could include
experimenting with varying values of n such as 3-grams, 4-grams, and 6-grams. Such
experiments would quantify the relationship between higher n and the accuracy of a
generic model. To compare and contrast the effectiveness of n-grams, experiments
could involve other features such as opcodes. We normalized the training and testing
vectors by dividing each frequency by the sum of the frequencies. These vectors could
be normalized by the total number of n-grams in the file.
Experiments could be conducted by varying the number of top features. We
considered the top 20 features from the malware class, but experiments could consider
more than 20 or less than 20 features to examine how feature selection affects accuracy.
We have considered four classification techniques: SVM, k-NN, random forest, and
MLP. Other techniques could be included such as hidden Markov models and deep
neural networks. Clustering techniques such as k-means and model-based clustering
would help to compare and contrast clustering and classification techniques.
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APPENDIX

A.1

Additional Results
Individual Family Results
Red colored bars indicate an accuracy lower than the average while blue bars

indicate an accuracy greater than or equal to the average. A darker share indicates
farther distance from the average while a lighter shade indicates closer distance to the
average.

Figure A.23: Individual family accuracy results using SVM
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Figure A.24: Individual family accuracy results using k-NN

Figure A.25: Individual family accuracy results using Random Forest
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Figure A.26: Individual family accuracy results using MLP
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